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Improving Board Decisions: The Promise
of Diversity
Cindy A. Schipani†
The board of directors plays an important role in United States
corporate governance.1 Corporate law requires board members,
particularly independent directors, to both outline corporate
strategy and monitor the performance of management. 2 Many
boards have failed to meet this important duty. Time after time, we
see corporate scandals escape a board’s attention. Examples of
recent corporate scandals include: the financial crisis of 2008, 3 sales
practice abuses at Wells Fargo,4 sexual harassment at NBC
involving Today host Matt Lauer,5 sexual misconduct by Harvey
Weinstein of the Weinstein Company,6 cheating on auto emissions
†. Merwin H. Waterman Collegiate Professor of Business Administrations and
Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan. The author wishes to gratefully
acknowledge the comments of the participants of the Feminism and Corporate Law:
Reforming Corporate Governance Roundtable hosted by the Minnesota Journal of
Law & Inequality and the research assistance of Brooke Bonnema, J.D., and Shane
Callaghan, J.D., University of Michigan Law School.
1. S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do Independent
Directors Curb Financial Fraud? The Evidence and Proposals for Further Reform, 93
IND. L.J. 757, 780 (2018) [hereinafter Avci et al., Independent Directors] (noting that
“[b]oards of directors have always been a traditional element of American corporate
governance”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 303 (2004) (noting
that board independence has increased in recent years).
2. Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783,
789 (2011); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Function of “Dysfunctional” Boards, 77 U. CIN.
L. REV. 391, 396 (2008) (both articles noting the board’s traditional function of
monitoring management).
3. Shivaram Rajgopal, Suraj Srinivasan & Yu Ting Forester Wong, Bank
Boards: What Has Changed Since the Financial Crisis, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 19, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/19/bankboards-what-has-changed-since-the-financial-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/DJ7R-NSEU].
4. See Eleanor Bloxham, Here’s How Wells Fargo’s Board of Directors Just
Failed Customers, FORTUNE (Apr. 14, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/04/14/wellsfargo-fake-accounts-2/ [perma.cc/E3KM-3ACY]; Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Scandal:
Where Was the Board?, CNN BUS. (Apr. 24, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/
2017/04/24/investing/wells-fargo-scandal-board-annual-meeting/index.html
[perma.cc/L6YZ-YQLR].
5. Caitlin Flanagan, Matt Lauer’s Woman Problem, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 5,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/lauer-had-a-problemwith-women/601405/ [perma.cc/M2MU-46MC].
6. Harvey Weinstein Timeline: How the Scandal Unfolded, BBC NEWS (May 29,
2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41594672
[perma.cc/
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tests at Volkswagen (VW),7 the ignition switch scandal at General
Motors (GM),8 the explosion in the Massey Energy coal mine,9 and
the Deep Water Horizon oil rig blowup.10 Presumably, all these
scandals were the result of either outright fraud or reckless and
wanton disregard for safety.
Some of the warning signs for these scandals appear to have
been dismissed by boards. For example, the Weinstein Company’s
board did not take corrective action when it became aware of
Harvey Weinstein’s settlements for multiple claims of sexual
misconduct.11 And NBCUniversal allegedly ignored sexual
harassment at the company for years before Matt Lauer was fired. 12
The warning signs for other scandals, such as GM’s ignition switch
scandal13 or the cheating on emissions tests at VW,14 may not have
risen to the level of the boards. Whether the boards’ failures were
disregarding facts, or willfully failing to seek them out, all these
scandals demonstrate that the board was unable to fulfill its
gatekeeping function—a function vital to corporate governance. 15
A3RK-9VDP].
7. Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10,
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772 [perma.cc/E72P-WR25].
8. Tanya Basu, Timeline: A History of GM’s Ignition Switch Defect, NPR (Mar.
31, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/03/31/297158876/timeline-a-history-of-gmsignition-switch-defect [perma.cc/K8DW-AEA2].
9. Sabrina Tavernise, Report Faults Mine Owner for Explosion that Killed 29,
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/us/20mine.html
[perma.cc/2H3B-AXAX].
10. Jie Jenny Zou, 8 Years After Deepwater Horizon Explosion, Is Another
Disaster Waiting to Happen?, NPR (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.npr.org/
2018/04/20/603669896/8-years-after-deepwater-horizon-explosion-is-anotherdisaster-waiting-to-happen [perma.cc/XC9W-6557].
11. See Dacher Keltner, Sex, Power, and the Systems that Enable Men Like
Harvey Weinstein, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/sexpower-and-the-systems-that-enable-men-like-harvey-weinstein
[perma.cc/8ZRK6EZM].
12. See Patrick Ryan, Ronan Farrow Says NBC’s Alleged Cover-up of Sexual
Misconduct Is ‘Bigger’ than Matt Lauer, USA TODAY (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/books/2019/10/14/ronan-farrownew-book-catch-and-kill-alleged-cover-up-harvey-weinstein-mattlauer/3948761002/ [perma.cc/KUQ3-56UN] (citing RONAN FARROW, CATCH AND
KILL: LIES, SPIES, AND A CONSPIRACY TO PROTECT PREDATORS (2019)) (“NBC
brokered nondisclosure agreements and seven-figure payouts with at least seven
women who alleged sexual harassment or discrimination at the company.”).
13. See Basu, supra note 8.
14. See Hotten, supra note 7.
15. See S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Elusive
Monitoring Function of Independent Directors, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 235, 285 (2018)
[hereinafter Avci et al., Elusive Monitoring Function] (critiquing the independent
directors’ role of “gatekeepers” in corporate law); see also Coffee, supra note 1, at 302
(defining “gatekeepers” as “independent professionals who pledge their reputational
capital” and describing their traditional role in securities markets as “protect[ing]
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Board diversity may help mitigate this problem. Although
progress is being made, corporate gatekeepers are still not diverse.
For example, women are struggling to reach business leadership
positions in the United States. The U.S. ranks fifty-third in the
World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index, with 21.7%
female board members.16 Though this percentage is low relative to
the female population, women are increasingly filling open board
seats.17 In 2019, women filled 45% of open board seats at Russell
3000 companies compared to only 12% in 2008. 18 And in July 2019,
the last all-male board in the S&P 500 added a female
representative.19 Lawmakers20 and investors21 are pressuring
companies to increase gender diversity on boards. Women of color,
however, only held 4.6% of Fortune 500 board seats in 2018, 22 and
ethnic minorities only filled 15% of open board seats in 2019 (and
held 10% of total board seats). This disparity indicates there has
been less progress with ethnic diversity.23
To address these deficiencies in corporate governance and
board diversity, this paper is organized as follows. Part I explains
three limitations on the effectiveness of independent board
the interests of dispersed investors who cannot easily take collective action”).
16. WORLD ECON. F., GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT 2020 11, 32–33 (2020),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Y27WL9A] (noting that the wage gap, rather than workforce participation, was the main
reason the U.S. was not ranked higher).
17. See Subodh Mishra, U.S. Board Diversity Trends in 2019, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 18, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/18/
u-s-board-diversity-trends-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/AMZ5-6RGW] (summarizing
the results of Institutional Shareholder Services’ diversity profile of Russell 3000
companies from 2008 to 2019).
18. Id.
19. Vanessa Fuhrmans, The Last All-Male Board on the S&P 500 Is No Longer,
WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-last-all-male-board-onthe-s-p-500-is-no-longer-11564003203 [https://perma.cc/4ZC5-NDPB].
20. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 (requiring public companies headquartered in
California to have one or more female directors, depending on the size of their board).
21. E.g., Joann S. Lublin & Sarah Krouse, State Street to Start Voting Against
Companies that Don’t Have Women Directors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-street-says-it-will-start-voting-againstcompanies-that-dont-have-women-directors-1488862863 [https://perma.cc/DMV8CRL5] (“[State Street Global Advisors] says it will vote against board members
charged with nominating new directors if they don’t soon make strides at adding
women.”).
22. DELOITTE, MISSING PIECES REPORT: THE 2018 BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF
WOMEN
AND
MINORITIES
ON
FORTUNE
500
BOARDS
17
(2018),
https://www.catalyst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/missing_pieces_report_
01152019_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK2J-PTHE] (analyzing diversity trends of
Fortune 500 companies from 2010 to 2018). Women and minorities held 22.5% and
16.1% of total Fortune 500 board seats in 2018, respectively. Id.
23. See Mishra, supra note 17.
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members in monitoring management. Part II proposes that board
diversity may mitigate these problems with outside directors and
uses research on gender diversity to argue this point, while
acknowledging cultural barriers. Part III introduces proposals from
corporate law lecturer, Professor Akshaya Kamalnath, for
improving the board’s access to information and diversity. This Part
further argues that once women are hired, companies need
programs to support their development to maximize the benefits of
diversity. Concluding remarks follow.
I.

The Difficult Role of Outside Directors

Corporate law relies upon outside directors to monitor
management.24 Relying on outside directors, however, may not be
as robust a solution as was once thought.25 The following sections
explain how outside directors are sometimes (A) not fully informed,
(B) not fully independent, or (C) potentially complicit in some
fraudulent schemes.
A. Outside Directors: Not Fully Informed
Currently, the corporate community expects independent
board members to monitor management.26 But in reality, this
expectation may not be fair. Although U.S. corporate law values the
independence of outside directors,27 independence, almost by

24. James Chen, Outside Director, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/outsidedirector.asp [https://perma.cc/N7AKLSHQ] (“An outside director is a member of a company’s board of directors who is
not an employee or stakeholder in the company.”).
25. James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering
the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2003)
(“[I]s the independent director up to the challenges that our expectations have placed
before the director?”); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside
Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 130–32 (2010) (arguing that the value of independent
directors “has been vastly overstated” and perhaps the solution lies with inside
directors, instead).
26. Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate
Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1864 (2007)
(commenting that a “near consensus” has risen in the global community that
increased independence of directors more effectively monitors management); see also
Avci et al., Illusive Monitoring Function, supra note 15, at 285 (noting corporate law
requires independent directors to protect the company from executive fraud); Sanjai
Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition
and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. L. 921, 921 (1999) (observing the trend toward board
independence back in 1999).
27. See Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and
Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1280–81 (2017) (observing that
“[i]ndependent directors are an important feature of U.S. boardrooms” and have been
encouraged by both the judiciary and by federal law); see also A.C. Pritchard,

2021]

Improving Board Decisions

299

definition, means that board members are not fully informed.
Outside directors are not involved in the day-to-day operations of
the firm.28 The best they can do is gather reasonably available
information.29 Yet it is the C-Suite,30 comprised of the same
individuals whom directors are tasked with monitoring, that
decides which information to disclose.31 This conflict complicates
independent board members’ quests to gather information. If CSuite executives are planning a get-rich-quick scheme, they can
easily hide it from outside directors. Even the most diligent, hardworking board may not receive the information necessary to
uncover intentional wrongdoing. Additionally, boards typically
meet only a few times per year and outside directors are normally
busy running other companies.32 Therefore, even the most wellintentioned board member may not have the bandwidth to
effectively monitor management.

Monitoring of Corporate Groups by Independent Directors, 9 J. KOREAN L. 1, 1–2
(2009) (noting that U.S. corporate law has long-valued director independence).
28. Cox, supra note 25, at 1082–83 (arguing that because of their lack of
involvement in the company’s regular activities, they often have inadequate
information); Fairfax, supra note 25, at 161 (citing Cox’s reasoning that independent
directors lack access to adequate information as a reason why outsiders may fail to
adequately monitor management).
29. See Fairfax, supra note 25, at 161–62 (commenting that outsiders often turn
to “advisors, attorneys, and accountants” for gathering information, but, even so,
these advisors are unlikely to be purely objective).
30. The term “C-Suite” describes the top level of executive corporate managers,
often with titles starting with C, such as the CEO (Chief Executive Officer), CFO
(Chief Financial Officer), or COO (Chief Operating Officer). See Andrew Blumenthal,
C-Suite, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/csuite.asp [https://perma.cc/NBF4-ZJU5].
31. See Fairfax, supra note 25, at 161 (noting that because independent directors
rely on insiders for information, it is difficult for them to assess whether the
information they receive is accurate); see also Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E.
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate
Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 58, 65
(2010) (observing that boards have become reliant on auditors and regulators to
discover managerial misconduct).
32. Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Corporate
Governance, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 669, 691 (2015) (“Sitting on many boards could also
result in directors who are so busy that they cannot give sufficient attention to any
given firm. At a certain point, board members might be too busy to conduct their
monitoring role diligently and effectively.”); Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: How
Busy Directors Could Cause the Next Financial Crisis, 59 B.C. L. REV. 877, 880 (2018)
(“America’s boardrooms are filled with directors who . . . serve as board members or
executives of other firms . . . . [O]ther board seats and outside employment limit a
director’s availability, contribute to cognitive overload, and thereby diminish the
director’s effectiveness.”); see also SPENCER STUART, 2017 SPENCER STUART U.S.
BOARD INDEX 18 (2017), https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/ssbi2017/
ssbi_2017_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/S376-53GC] (finding that on average, S&P 500
independent board members sit on the board of two public companies).
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B. Outside Directors: Not Fully Independent
Not only are outside directors likely not fully informed, they
may also not be fully independent. That is, even outside board
members may be “captured” by the CEO and other executives.33
This capture may occur when board members and executives
inhabit the same social circles, operate in the same professional
networks, or are otherwise friends.34 These relationships suggest a
lack of objectivity and may prevent board members from
questioning managements’ strategies and decisions. For instance,
in the options backdating scandal at Comverse Technology, Inc. in
2006, the board unwittingly approved stock options for fictitious
employees at management’s direction.35 The board even granted an
option to an employee named “I. M. Fanton.”36 That was hardly an
inconspicuous moniker for a phantom employee, but not one board
member apparently saw any grounds for suspicion.37
C. Outside Directors and Complicity
In addition to lacking the full independence necessary for
genuine oversight of executive decisions, outside directors may
become complicit in wrongdoing. Complicity is especially tempting
when there is significant money on the table and no real fear of
getting caught. Empirical studies have shown that not only do some
33. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 57 (2008) (“The problem with boards is their unique susceptibility to capture
by the managers they are supposed to monitor.”); Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili,
“Captured Boards”: The Rise of “Super Directors” and the Case for a Board Suite, 19
WIS. L. REV. 19, 27–30 (observing that the reliance of outside directors on
management for information and their limited firm-specific knowledge reduces the
chance they are independent); Kress, supra note 32, at 883–84 (observing that boards
form close relationships to management and become emotionally invested in
management’s success, making them ineffective monitors).
34. See Vikramaditya Khanna, E. Han Kim & Yao Lu, CEO Connectedness and
Corporate Fraud, 70 J. FIN. 1203, 1242–43 (2015) (explaining that board members
can be connected to CEOs through “common network ties”).
35. Litigation Release No. 21090, SEC, SEC Sues Comverse Technology, Inc. for
Fraudulent Options Backdating and Earnings Management Schemes (June 18,
2009), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21090.htm [https://perma.cc/
BF47-LC9K]; M. P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic
Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1610–11
(2007) (“The executives purportedly went so far as to create a so-called ‘slush fund’
of backdated options in the names of fictitious employees, hidden from the company’s
auditors.”).
36. See Tim Annett, Ghost Story, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2006),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115514263305431169
[https://perma.cc/SNB54ZST].
37. See Litigation Release No. 21090, supra note 35; see also Annett, supra note
36 (explaining that the fake names were gradually intermingled with actual
employees to snooker the directors into approving them).
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outside directors fail to exercise sufficient checks on the behavior of
executives, they may also succumb to the temptation to join in
malfeasance. For example, a study examining manipulation of the
timing of granting stock options to outside directors analyzed the
profits made by outside directors who controlled that timing.38 The
study found that the profits made were strongly suggestive of the
directors’ complicity in the manipulation of stock options to assure
that the options were in the money. 39 Another study similarly found
directors were “lucky” in their receipt of stock option grants. 40
Lucky directors are those who receive “lucky grants,” which are
grants given at the lowest price in a given grant month. 41 The
researchers found that lucky grants were not given to executives or
independent directors as a result of routine corporate activity. 42
Instead, they found that these lucky grants were likely deliberately
given to executives and directors to increase their profits.43 That is,
grants were awarded to directors at the lowest price of the month
apparently due to backdating or the knowledge of future stock
appreciation.44 Therefore, so-called “lucky directors” may have
profited from illicit behavior rather than luck.45 Perhaps even
worse, there is evidence that boards may have been complicit in
manipulating the disclosure of information to the market.46 This
38. See Avci et al., Independent Directors, supra note 1.
39. Id. The term “in the money” means “an option that possesses intrinsic value”
where that value is more favorable compared “to the prevailing market price of the
underlying asset.” Cory Mitchell, In the Money (ITM), INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 7, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/inthemoney.asp
[https://perma.cc/C48BXRGA].
40. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein & Urs Peyer, Lucky CEOs and
Lucky Directors, 65 J. FIN. 2363 (2010) (observing the opportunistically timed stock
option grants given to executives and outside directors).
41. Id. at 2368.
42. Id. at 2364–65.
43. Id. at 2364.
44. See id. at 2382 (“Although we do not know for certain which lucky grants
were produced by backdating, we identify a pool of grants—those awarded at the
lowest price of the month—in which a large fraction was likely produced by
opportunistic timing.”).
45. Id. at 2399 (“We show that the grants awarded to independent directors, who
are charged with overseeing the company’s executives, were themselves affected by
opportunistic timing. The timing of director grants was not merely a byproduct of
the directors being simultaneously awarded grants with executives or of firms
routinely timing grants to all recipients.”).
46. See S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Ending Executive
Manipulations of Incentive Compensation, 42 J. CORP. L. 277, 285–88 (2016)
[hereinafter Avci et al., Executive Manipulations] (citing Robert M. Daines et al.,
Right on Schedule: CEO Option Grants and Opportunism 2 (Stan. U. & BYU,
Working Paper No. 3314, 2015)) (“To reduce the risk of this type of distortion,
scholars have suggested that boards and analysts stay aware of the incentives
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manipulation occurs by either “spring-loading” (delaying disclosure
of positive news until after the option grant date, so that the option
will be in the money), or “bullet-dodging” (expediting disclosure of
negative news before the option grant date, lowering the strike price
of the option).47 Unfortunately, as these and other studies48 suggest,
not all directors are immune from the temptation to make easy
money.
Thus, not only may some outside board members fail at the
monitoring function, they may be tempted to engage in illegal
behavior themselves. At the same time, simply changing the law to
strengthen the board’s monitoring function is not without its
downsides. For example, as board members monitor more,
executives may reveal less to them.49 That is, improving board
monitoring may sow distrust between the board and executives.50
Any solution aimed at improving board monitoring must therefore
also improve the trust between the board and company executives.
In other words, a solution must focus on the functions of board
members as well as the culture of the company they are monitoring.
II. The Potential of Diversity to Improve Board
Functioning
Increasing the diversity of board membership may help
address the aforementioned problems created by uninformed, not
fully independent, or complicit outside directors on boards who fail
to properly monitor executives. Akshaya Kamalnath’s research and

established by scheduled options and closely monitor disclosures.”).
47. Avci et al., Executive Manipulations, supra note 46, at 286.
48. See, e.g., Daniel W. Collins, Guojin Gong & Haidan Li, Corporate Governance
and Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 26 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH. 403, 404
(2009) (“[I]nterlocking boards are at least partially responsible for spreading the
backdating practice across firms.”); see also Narayanan et al., supra note 35 at 1614–
15 (noting that directors may violate federal securities law if they recklessly
disregard “red flags” in executives’ representations regarding stock option grants).
49. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law,
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89
GEO. L.J. 797, 813 (2001) (noting that CEOs may trust outside directors less and
thus reveal less information to them); see also Bebchuk, supra note 27, at 1312
(“Having [independent directors] . . . would interfere with board cohesiveness and
undermine the trust between the board and corporate insiders . . . .”).
50. Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1233, 1310 (2003) (“[C]orporate governance scholars have cautioned that too
many independent directors on a board may weaken the trust needed among the
CEO and board members . . . .”); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sex, Trust, and
Corporate Boards, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 174–75 (2007) (commenting on
how independent directors may distrust C-Suite executives even if the CEO helped
choose them).
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the studies on gender diversity discussed below support this
proposition.
A. Kamalnath’s Proposal
Kamalnath suggests improving the monitoring function of the
board through diversity. Proposing a way to achieve that
diversity,51 she hypothesizes that improving the diversity of each
board’s membership will increase the expression of nonconforming
opinions, which will improve the board’s monitoring of
management.52
Turning to the example of gender to evaluate Kamalnath’s
proposal, there are numerous studies supporting the theory that
gender diversity improves firm performance.53 For example, the
National Center for Women and Technology found that companies
with women on their boards outperformed companies with all-male
boards in a variety of industries.54 This trend was first observed
after the 2008 global economic crash, suggesting that gender
diversity might matter even more in a struggling economy and that
gender diversity on a board may decrease the company’s volatility.55
Research like this has led Christine Lagarde of the International
51. Akshaya Kamalnath, Strengthening Boards through Diversity: A Two-Sided
Market that Can Be Effectively Serviced by Intermediaries, 40 LAW & INEQ.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 1) (on file with Minnesota Journal Law &
Inequality).
52. See id. (manuscript at 11) (“[D]iverse candidates are likely to come from
different social circles and hence will not hesitate to question management.”); AARON
A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY 15 (2015).
53. E.g., LOIS JOY, NANCY M. CARTER, HARVEY M. WAGNER & SRIRAM
NARAYANAN, CATALYST, THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND
WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS (2007), https://www.catalyst.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/The_Bottom_Line_Corporate_Performance_and_Womens_
Representation_on_Boards.pdf [perma.cc/EPJ2-WKRT] (finding that Fortune 500
boards with more women enjoy better returns on equity, sales, and invested capital);
see also FRANCESCA LAGERBERG, GRANT THORNTON, WOMEN IN BUSINESS: THE
VALUE OF DIVERSITY 3 (2015), https://www.grantthornton.global/globalassets/
wib_value_of_diversity.pdf [perma.cc/M3DM-BP4N] (discovering that in the U.S.,
boards with both genders represented have an almost 2% greater return on assets
than male-only boards); see also Tim Smedley, Diversity at the Top Pays Dividends,
FIN. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016) (quoting Marcus Noland, Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ.),
https://www.ft.com/content/82a3aee2-d97d-11e5-a72f-1e7744c66818
[perma.cc/JT4Z-QGQW] (“[F]irms with more women can expect a 6 percentage point
increase in net profit.”).
54. LECIA BARKER, CYNTHIA MANCHA & CATHERINE ASHCRAFT, NAT’L CTR. FOR
WOMEN & INFO. TECH., WHAT I S THE IMPACT OF GENDER DIVERSITY ON TECHNOLOGY
BUSINESS PERFORMANCE? RESEARCH SUMMARY 3 (2014), https://www.ncwit.org/
sites/default/files/resources/impactgenderdiversitytechbusinessperformance_print.p
df [perma.cc/N66C-CYBD] (“Gender-diverse management teams showed superior
return on equity, debt/equity ratios, price/equity ratios, and average growth.”).
55. Id.
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Monetary Fund, then the organization’s managing director, to
comment: “[I]f it had been the Lehman Sisters rather than the
Lehman Brothers, the world might well look a lot different today.”56
Additionally, research has suggested that companies with more
female board members may be more proactive about corporate
social responsibility issues.57 Indeed, diverse inputs may lead to
innovation as more perspectives bring more to the table.58 Yet
increasing board member diversity can be challenging: diverse
members may be unsure when to speak up, and they may be less
likely to be heard when they do.59
B. Difficulties for Women on Boards
The hypothesis that diverse boards may lead to better
monitoring is supported by a study conducted by Michael McDonald
and James Westphal.60 This study focused on the diversity of
incoming board members and their access to mentoring.61 The
researchers suggest that the board benefits from diversity on the
board, but also found that women were not being mentored, which
inhibited their advancement.62 That is, according to the study,
newly appointed male board members received informal mentoring
56. See Christine Lagarde, Ten Years After Lehman – Lessons Learned and
Challenges Ahead, IMFBLOG (Sept. 5, 2018), https://blogs.imf.org/2018/09/05/tenyears-after-lehman-lessons-learned-and-challenges-ahead/ [perma.cc/7VAY-NG4A].
57. Eunjung Hyun, Daegyu Yang, Hojin Jung & Kihoon Hong, Women on Boards
and Corporate Social Responsibility, SUSTAINABILITY, Apr. 2016, at 1, 2 (2016)
(noting that women are more likely to speak up about corporate social responsibility
issues for reputational reasons, or because they may be more morally oriented
towards social responsibility).
58. See Stephen Turban, Dan Wu & Letian Zhang, Research: When Gender
Diversity Makes Firms More Productive, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/02/research-when-gender-diversity-makes-firms-moreproductive [perma.cc/2WEJ-K4QC] (“Significant research has shown that diverse
teams can develop more innovative ideas.”).
59. See Michael McDonald & James Westphal, Access Denied: Low Mentoring of
Women and Minority First-Time Directors and Its Negative Effects on Appointments
to Additional Boards, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1169, 1173–74 (2013) (arguing that because
women do not receive the mentoring opportunities that men do, they are not as aware
of when to speak up or not in the professional setting); see also Susan Chira, The
Universal Phenomenon of Men Interrupting Women, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/business/women-sexism-work-huffingtonkamala-harris.html [perma.cc/QD87-VPSX] (observing that women are often
interrupted or decide not to speak when outnumbered by men).
60. See McDonald & Westphal, supra note 59.
61. Id. at 1169.
62. See id. (citing Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom
and Their Impact on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (2009))
(“[D]emographic minority directors may be, at least in some respects, more
conscientious in executing their director roles and may be more independent from
management.”).
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about board culture, such as raising issues to management before
formal board meetings rather than during meetings, 63 whereas
newly appointed women did not. This mentorship inequity in turn
resulted in women speaking up more often than men in meetings 64
and consequently, not being selected for other board positions
because they were perceived as less savvy in navigating their roles,
thus hurting women’s future career opportunities.65
The findings from McDonald and Westphal’s study raise
several questions: First, why are women not receiving the informal
mentoring that men receive? Second, why are women’s careers
harmed for speaking up and doing their job? And third, why are
men, who typically receive more mentoring, not being mentored to
ask more questions and to take their monitoring role more
seriously? These concerns demonstrate the need to change the
prevailing culture of boards. Board members should be applauded,
not penalized, for speaking up, asking questions, and seeking
information. A board’s culture should allow questions to be openly
asked and answered, regardless of who is asking the questions.
When corporate culture punishes women for speaking up, it
follows that women may be reluctant to speak up in the future. This
reluctance not only hurts the company, as potential company
improvements are ignored,66 but also harms the silenced
individuals.67 Employees who feel their voices are not heard may
63. Id. at 1173–76 (finding that mentoring for first-time directors is important
for them to win support in the boardroom).
64. Id. at 1182 (“[F]irst-time directors who are racial minorities or women receive
significantly lower levels of participation process mentoring than first-time directors
who are white males.”).
65. See id. at 1174, 1197 (stating that a first-time director’s failure to understand
board norms, including the appropriate venues to raise concerns and questions about
strategy and policy issues, will ultimately hinder their ability to receive further
board appointments).
66. See Cindy A. Schipani, Frances J. Milliken & Terry M. Dworkin, The Impact
of Employment Law and Practices on Business and Society: The Significance of
Worker Voice, 19 PA. J. BUS. L. 979, 985 (2017) [hereinafter Schipani et al.,
Significance of Worker Voice] (“An employee is therefore more likely to engage in
voice behaviors to the extent that she has a strong desire or sense of obligation to
help the organization operate more effectively . . . .”); see also Linn Van Dyne &
Jeffrey LePine, Helping and Voice Extra-role Behaviors: Evidence of Construct and
Predictive Validity, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 108, 109 (1998) (“[V]oice [is] promotive
behavior that emphasizes expression of constructive challenge intended to improve
rather than merely criticize.”).
67. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 113 (1999)
(noting that employees themselves believe their work would improve if they had a
greater voice in the company); see also Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia
L. McCormick & Jintong Tang, The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO.
L. REV. 961, 1019 (2017) (“Diverse employees often feel pressure to mute some aspect
of their identity to fit into their workplace culture.”); see also Stephen Befort, A New
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face more stress because they feel less in control of their work
environment.68 Research has shown that workplace stress has
many negative effects. For example, higher stress is correlated with
employees skipping work more often.69 Stress can also lead to
physical ailments or aggravate pre-existing health conditions.70
Put more positively, speaking up may help at both an
individual and an organizational level. When able to speak up and
feel heard, employees are more likely to have better attitudes
toward their duties.71 They are also likely to think more highly of
the company for which they work.72 On an organizational level,
happier employees may be more committed to improving their
company.73 Although these studies demonstrate the positive effects
that speaking up has on employees, board members may also
experience these same effects.
Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an American Works Councils Act, 69 MO. L.
REV. 607, 611–12 (2004) (discussing how employees with stronger voices in the
company are more likely to be satisfied, loyal, and stay with the company longer).
68. See E.W. Morrison & F.J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A Barrier to
Change and Development in a Pluralistic World, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 706, 721
(2000) (stating that employees might use destructive means to establish control if
constructive means are unavailable); see also Schipani et al., Significance of Worker
Voice, supra note 66, at 986 (“[T]he suppression of voice behaviors and the perceived
lack of voice opportunities can create feelings of stress . . . .”).
69. Thomas W. Colligan & Eileen M. Higgins, Workplace Stress: Etiology &
Consequences, 21 J. WORKPLACE BEHAV. HEALTH 89, 93 (2006) (“Workplace stress
has been shown to . . . increase absenteeism . . . .”); Schipani et al., Significance of
Worker Voice, supra note 66, at 990–91 (observing the psychological and physical
health effects of when employees’ voices are not heard in their companies).
70. See Colligan & Higgins, supra note 69, at 91–92 (describing a typical physical
response to chronic stress); Schipani et al., Significance of Worker Voice, supra note
66 (“Stress-induced medical conditions include bodily pains, dizziness, headaches,
heart disease, asthma, and hypertension.”).
71. See Michael Bashshur & Burak Oc, When Voice Matters: A Multilevel Review
of the Impact of Voice in Organizations, 41 J. MGMT. 1530, 1535–36 (2015) (noting a
positive relationship between employee voice and job satisfaction in multiple
studies); see also Schipani et al., Significance of Worker Voice, supra note 66, at 988
(“[E]mployees who perceive that they have input into procedures and outcomes are
likely to view such procedures and outcomes as fairer.”).
72. See Bashshur & Oc, supra note 71, at 1536 (observing a positive relationship
between employee voice opportunities and trust in authority); see also Schipani et
al., Significance of Worker Voice, supra note 66, at 988 (“[Employees] may also feel
more like valued members of the organization if they perceive that they are treated
fairly at the workplace.”).
73. See Schipani et al., Significance of Worker Voice, supra note 66, at 989–90
(observing that when employees have the opportunity to speak, they feel more
committed to their companies); see also Naz Beheshti, 10 Timely Statistics About the
Connection Between Employee Engagement and Wellness, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nazbeheshti/2019/01/16/10-timely-statistics-about-theconnection-between-employee-engagement-and-wellness/?sh=5d7bd35a22a0
[perma.cc/EPJ2-WKRT] (“Employees who feel their voice is heard are 4.6 times more
likely to feel empowered to perform their best work.”).
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Not only is it important for board members to raise their
voices, but if their voices are diverse (as Kamalnath proposes), 74
boards may be more likely to find innovative solutions to problems.
Studies have shown that diversity in multiple characteristics, such
as “age, nationality, gender, [and] racial diversity” can all help
increase innovation,75 encouraging the company to consider doing
things differently.76 Therefore, companies with more diverse boards
may be less likely to get stuck in practices that do not improve
company performance.77 In addition to making companies more
adaptable, board diversity may also increase innovation through
widening a company’s “knowledge base.”78 Furthermore, a diverse
board may help executives understand the market from a more
holistic perspective as the board members would represent a
broader range of constituents.79
III.

Potential Solutions to Improve Board Monitoring

This Part discusses Kamalnath’s proposal to improve the
board’s monitoring of management, which includes (1) inviting
board members to attend management meetings and (2)
empowering third parties to recruit diverse board candidates.80 It
also argues that mentorship and sponsorship programs are
important to the advancement of new, diverse employees and board
members.

74. Kamalnath, supra note 51 (manuscript at 3) (suggesting that increasing
board diversity will improve its monitoring of management).
75. Fabrice Galia & Emmanuel Zenou, Board Composition and Forms of
Innovation: Does Diversity Make a Difference? (June 27, 2016) (manuscript at 1, 3)
(published in 6 EUR. J. INT’L MGMT. 630 (2012)); see also Donald C. Hambrick &
Phyllis A. Mason, Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top
Managers, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 193, 202 (1984) (“[N]ovel problem solving is best
handled by a heterogenous group in which diversity of opinion, knowledge, and
background allows a thorough airing of alternatives.”).
76. See Christian R. Østergaard, Bram Timmermans & Kari Kristinsson, Does a
Different View Create Something New? The Effect of Employee Diversity on
Innovation, 40 RSCH. POL’Y 500, 500 (2011) (“Employee diversity . . . make[s] the
firm more open towards new ideas and more creative.”).
77. See id.
78. Id. (noting that more diversity increases a firm’s knowledge base, which in
turn creates more opportunities for innovation).
79. See Galia & Zenou, supra note 75 (manuscript at 2) (“According to many
studies . . . diversity provides the firm with several advantages such as greater
creativity, better understanding of the market, effective problem solving and
enhanced capability.”).
80. See Kamalnath, supra note 51 (manuscript at 6, 15).
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A. Kamalnath’s Proposals
Kamalnath suggests there are several ways to create more
diverse boards that can effectively monitor management.
i.

Include Board Members in Executive Meetings

In addition to diversity increasing a board’s access to
information at a company, Kamalnath discusses other potential
solutions to ensure information is readily available to the board. 81
One such example is the so-called “Netflix model.”82 At Netflix, the
executives ensure information is accessible to the board by asking
directors to regularly listen in on management meetings.83 Netflix
also requires executives to provide the board with detailed memos
on the corporation’s activities and allows the board to question the
executives about these memos.84 A board with information on the
company’s activities readily available—and the ability to question
it—can create a culture of openness and free thinking between the
board and management.
ii. Empower Third Party Intermediaries
Kamalnath also proposes that third party intermediaries may
be able to assist in recruiting diverse members to the firm, as well
as mediate a shift in culture.85 She suggests the market for
intermediaries is two-sided.86 On one side, third parties can help
companies find diverse board candidates.87 On the other side, third
parties can help potential board members assess a company’s
81. See id. (manuscript at 6–10) (discussing proposals to outsource the board’s
functions, empower well informed board members, and follow the “Netflix model”).
82. Id. (manuscript at 6–7) (describing the “Netflix model” as requiring directors
to “regularly attend monthly and quarterly senior management meetings” as
observers and to adopt a “memo-based culture[,]” as opposed to a presentation
culture).
83. See id. (manuscript at 6).
84. See id. (“[B]oard communications are ‘structured as approximately 30-page
online memos in narrative form that not only include links to supporting analysis
but also allow open access to all data and information on the company’s internal
shared systems, including the ability to ask clarifying questions of the subject
authors.’” (quoting David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Netflix Approach to Governance:
Genuine Transparency with the Board, (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Stanford
Closer Look Ser. No. CGRP71, 2018)).
85. See id. (manuscript at 15–17).
86. See id. (manuscript at 14) (“[E]xecutive search firms . . . facilitate
transactions between companies and potential executives.” (internal citations
omitted)).
87. See id. (manuscript at 14–15) (suggesting that third parties find and vet
diverse candidates for companies to improve their boards or to minimally signal they
are socially responsible).
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culture.88 Because they see both sides of the market, Kamalnath
notes that third parties can “fill information gaps” between boards
and potential candidates.89 In turn, she observes that the work of
third parties shapes “corporate culture generally” through advising
how to create a more inclusive corporate culture and attracting a
more diverse pool of individuals for board seats.90
To further the work of third-party intermediaries, it is
necessary for executives and board members to fully invest in the
approach. Otherwise, they could easily shop for an outside opinion
that blindly praises the board’s functioning. This approach could
lead to “tick-the-box compliance” instead of critically evaluating the
board to improve its effectiveness.91 Yet when properly utilized,
these third parties can help improve a board’s diversity and
performance.
B. Mentoring, Sponsoring, and Networking
Once more diverse candidates are hired into companies—
which, in turn, feed the pipeline for corporate boards—they need
proper mentoring to succeed. Gender discrimination has been
illegal for some time,92 so presumably, overt discrimination is not
the reason why boards have few women members.93 Instead,
88. See id. (manuscript at 14) (“[D]iverse candidates want to be able to accurately
assess boards before joining them.”).
89. Id. (manuscript at 14–15) (noting that the benefits of using executive search
firms outweigh the costs).
90. Id. (manuscript at 15–16) (“[Executive search firms] work to manage
unconscious bias . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
91. Id. (manuscript at 17) (citing Luca Enriques & Dirk Zerzsche, Quack
Corporate Governance, Round III: Bank Board Regulation Under the New European
Capital Requirement Directive, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 211 (2015)) (observing
that the European Union’s board evaluation requirements do not lead to meaningful
board engagement).
92. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964);
Cindy A. Schipani & Terry M. Dworkin, The Need for Mentors in Promoting Gender
Diverse Leadership in the #MeToo Era, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1272, 1275–80 (2019)
[hereinafter Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era] (detailing Title VII’s
protections and other laws that prohibit sexual harassment in the workplace).
93. See Cindy A. Schipani, Terry M. Dworkin, Angel Kwolek-Folland & Virginia
G. Maurer, Pathways for Women to Obtain Positions of Organizational Leadership:
The Significance of Mentoring and Networking, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89,
97–98 (2009) (internal citations omitted) (“The more usual forms of discrimination,
however, are the subtle but clear cultural biases and gender stereotypes in corporate
decision-making, behavior, and job assignment.”); see also Karen S. Lyness & Donna
E. Thompson, Above the Glass Ceiling? A Comparison of Matched Samples of Female
and Male Executives, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 359, 372 (1997) (“[W]omen are more
likely to be found in jobs that are not comparable to men’s jobs in status, power, or
advancement potential.”). Subtle discrimination has persisted for decades. See O.C.
Brenner, Joseph Tomkiewicz & Virginia Ellen Schein, The Relationship Between Sex
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unconscious biases may be at play as humans tend to value people
who are similar to them.94 Because men are more often the leaders
of a company, this norm may result in women often being
considered outsiders by company leadership.95 Mentoring programs
may help counter these unconscious biases.96
Furthermore, mentoring provides many benefits that can turn
women into insiders. Mentoring, for instance, exposes “both parties
to the values, beliefs, and assumptions of the other.” 97 Mentoring
may also further the careers of those mentored.98 It helps mentees
adapt more quickly to the corporate culture and introduces them to
influential figures within the corporation who could help advance
their careers.99 Furthermore, employees with informal mentors are
Role Stereotypes and Requisite Management Characteristics Revisited, 32 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 662, 668 (1989) (noting that although there is an increase in women in
lower and middle management positions, the attitudes of male managers have not
changed and impede women from obtaining positions in upper management); see also
Belle Rose Ragins & Eric Sundstrom, Gender and Power in Organizations: A
Longitudinal Perspective, 105 PSYCH. BULL. 51, 63 (1989) (noting gender
stereotyping is one obstacle to female success in the corporate world).
94. See Georgia T. Chao & Henry Moon, The Cultural Mosaic: A Metatheory for
Understanding the Complexity of Culture, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1128, 1135 (2005)
(describing research on why people prefer to interact with those who are similar to
them); see also DONN BYRNE, THE ATTRACTION PARADIGM 211 (1971) (discussing the
similarity-attraction theory, which claims humans gravitate to those with whom we
are similar); Terry M. Dworkin, Cindy A. Schipani, Frances J. Milliken & Madeline
K. Kneeland, Assessing the Progress of Women in Corporate America: The More
Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 725 (2018)
[hereinafter Dworkin et al., Progress of Women in Corporate America] (“Socialidentity theory . . . posits that individuals attach differing value to various social
categories and assign more value to those categories with which they personally
identify.”).
95. See Dworkin et al., Progress of Women in Corporate America, supra note 94,
at 755 (discussing how the perception of women as outsiders makes mentoring
programs important in elevating women up the corporate ladder).
96. See Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1288
(arguing that mentoring women may help connect them to career opportunities they
may not otherwise have if male management subconsciously “views them as less
capable”); see also Terry M. Dworkin, Aarti Ramaswami & Cindy A. Schipani, The
Role of Networks, Mentors, and the Law in Overcoming Barriers to Organizational
Leadership for Women with Children, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 83, 115–16 (2013)
(observing that mentoring may improve the networks of women with dependents).
97. Dworkin et al., Progress of Women in Corporate America, supra note 94, at
755 (continuing on to suggest mentoring will help women “be seen as part of the
same club as men”).
98. See Tammy D. Allen, Lillian T. Eby, Mark L. Poteet & Elizabeth Lentz,
Career Benefits Associated with Mentoring for Protégés: A Meta-analysis, 89 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 127 (2004); see also Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo
Era, supra note 92, at 1287 (stating that mentors support the career development of
their mentees).
99. See Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1287
(citing Allen et al., supra note 98, at 128) (noting how mentoring teaches mentees
about how an organization functions and helps communicate mentees’ value to
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more likely to be noticed within a company, as mentors can draw
the attention of decision makers to their mentees.100
Not only does mentoring help boost a mentee’s career, it can
also improve their mental health.101 A mentor can provide their
mentee with emotional support during stressful moments at
work.102 Mentees may also turn to their mentors for advice when
feeling stuck on a project.103 These professional relationships may
become personal friendships as well.104 On a macro-level,
mentorship helps the mentee feel connected to and accepted by the
corporation and that the company believes the mentee is worth its
investment.105 Mentors also receive positive psychological benefits
from mentorship, such as feeling appreciated by their coworkers. 106
Sponsorship programs (whether formal or informal) are
another tool that may help increase the diversity of the workforce—
and thus future diversity on boards. Sponsorship differs from
mentorship because a mentor shares their institutional knowledge
with the mentee, while a sponsor uses their influence to help the
protege rise within a corporation.107 The corporate community often
prefers mentoring over sponsoring.108 Some companies have
stopped their formal sponsorship programs because executives felt
uncomfortable advocating for junior colleagues whom they felt were
unprepared for promotion.109 Indeed, sponsorship creates higher
risks for executives as it asks them to put their reputation on the

decision-makers).
100. See id.
101. See id. at 1289 (“Studies have indicated that informal relationships tend to
be more beneficial both psychosocially and for career development . . . .”).
102. See id. at 1287 (quoting Allen et al., supra note 98, at 128) (stating that a
mentor’s psychosocial function includes “counseling[] and friendship”).
103. See id.
104. Id. at 1287 (quoting Allen et al., supra note 98, at 128).
105. See id. at 1288 (stating that mentoring will help women feel less like
outsiders in organizations); see also Allen et al., supra note 98, at 128 (stating that
mentoring includes “psychosocial functions,” one of which is “acceptance”).
106. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1287
(quoting Kathy E. Kram, Phases of the Mentor Relationship, 26 ACAD. MGMT. J. 608,
613–14 (1983)) (“[M]entors, in turn, are benefitted through ‘recognition and respect
from peers and superiors’ for developing the talent.”).
107. Herminia Ibarra, A Lack of Sponsorship is Keeping Women from Advancing
into Leadership, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/08/a-lack-ofsponsorship-is-keeping-women-from-advancing-into-leadership
[https://perma.cc/
T6YG-MRQB] (describing the difference between a sponsor and a mentor).
108. See id. (“Typically, [organizations] abandon sponsorship because . . . you
cannot mandate that [senior executives] spend their personal capital advocating for
people they don’t know well . . . .”).
109. Id.
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line for junior colleagues.110 On the other hand, sponsorship
provides higher rewards for junior colleagues than mentorship
does.111 Thus, companies should provide opportunities that
facilitate informal sponsorship as well as mentorship programs.
In addition to mentorship and sponsorship, professional
networking also helps women feel more accepted at work.112 Women
are often not given control over the most valuable client projects. 113
This exclusion could be because management sees women as less
competent than their male counterparts or holds women to a higher
standard when proving their competence.114 Networking may help
women bring valuable clients to the firm and thus gain ownership
of important projects.115 Networking may also help debunk
stereotypes of women being too burdened by marital or familial life
to fully participate in the organization.116 Furthermore, studies
have shown that networking can result in a better salary, improved
career development, and even better job performance
evaluations.117
In their above-mentioned study, McDonald and Westphal
concluded that women were not receiving the same mentoring
opportunities that men were, and thus, women were offered fewer

110. Id.
111. See id. (“[H]aving a mentor increased the likelihood of promotion two years
later for men, but had no effect on promotion for women.”).
112. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1292–94
(observing the ways networking can benefit women in the workplace); see also
Kristen Hicks, Why Professional Networking Groups for Women Remain Valuable,
FAST COMPANY (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90448654/the-benefitsof-womens-networking-groups [https://perma.cc/8ACP-WUVN] (“[I]nner [female]
networks help not just with finding opportunities, but also by exchanging advice
specific to the unique challenges women face.”).
113. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1287–88
(citing Paula Santonocito, Women Pipeline, 27 EMP. ALERT 3, 3 (2010)).
114. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, THE
UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 6 (2001) (stating that
female attorneys are not presumed to be competent, as men are, and citing studies
where a majority of women feel they are held to a higher standard); see Schipani &
Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1288 (stating that gender
stereotypes can lead to women not being assigned to the company’s most valuable
clients).
115. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1287–88
(citing Santonocito, supra note 113, at 3) (commenting that not getting more
“valuable clients” is one obstacle women face in climbing the corporate ladder).
116. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1288; see
also Dworkin et al., Progress of Women in Corporate America, supra note 94.
117. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1289
(citing Hans-Georg Wolff & Klaus Moser, Effects of Networking on Career Success: A
Longitudinal Study, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 196, 196–97, 202 (2009)) (observing the
benefits networking can have on one’s professional life).
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opportunities to serve on additional boards.118 Mentoring
opportunities may help more women attain board positions, with
the direct effect of creating more gender-diverse boards.119 And, as
Kamalnath argues, greater board diversity may, in turn, help
improve the board’s monitoring of management.120
C. Integrity
It is also critically important to look for individuals of high
integrity when appointing C-Suite executives as well as board
members, and to have internal controls in place so that good people
are not tempted to do bad things. As previously mentioned, we have
seen executives perpetrate elaborate and not-so-elaborate schemes
to hide fraud.121 And in some cases, we have even seen likely
complicity between management and the directors.122 Integrity in
both the C-Suite and the boardroom is thus critical.
D. Applying Equal Standards Across the Board
Finally, in addition to increasing board diversity, it is also
important to hold all board members to the same standards. This
application of equal standards is not necessarily the case today. For
example, during the ongoing Black Lives Matter movement,
reporters have observed that, following allegations of gaslighting,
emotional abuse, or underpaying or ignoring the opinions of people
of color, female business founders were stepping down from their
leadership positions more quickly than their male counterparts. 123
118. McDonald & Westphal, supra note 59, at 1174.
119. See id. at 1190 (“[D]isadvantages in mentoring might contribute to the
difficulties that women and minorities have in attaining other kinds of highinfluence positions in the corporate world.”).
120. Kamalnath, supra note 51.
121. See, e.g., Annett, supra note 36 (describing how Comverse Technology, Inc.’s
executives tricked the board into approving stock grants for fictitious employees and
how “[t]he Enron scandal had accounting vehicles named after ‘Star Wars’
characters”).
122. See, e.g., Avci et al., Executive Manipulations, supra note 46, at 285–88 (citing
Robert M. Daines, Grant R. McQueen & Robert J. Schonlau, Right on Schedule: CEO
Option Grants and Opportunism, 53 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1025, 1055
(2018)).
123. Leah Chernikoff, Are All These Female-Founder Takedowns Fair?, THE
HELM (May 14, 2020), https://thehelm.co/female-founder-takedowns-outdoor-voicesaway-the-wing/ [perma.cc/JH9J-KWYV] (observing that three female business
founders stepped down after allegations of mismanagement, while the press was
slow to report more incriminating behavior by male founders); see also Katie
Robertson, Refinery29 Editor Resigns After Former Employees Describe ‘Toxic
Culture’, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/business/
media/refinery-29-christene-barberich.html [perma.cc/4TT6-N6VT] (stating that
Refinery29 co-founder Christene Barberich resigned after allegations of racial
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After employees called out companies for creating toxic
environments for people of color, the female founders of The
Wing,124 Man Repeller,125 and Refinery29126 (to name a few) all
stepped down. These quick departures starkly contrast with how
long it took the male founders of Uber (Travis Kalanick) and
WeWork (Adam Neumann) to step down.127 Kalanick allegedly
created a sexist work culture at Uber, which involved “sexual
harassment, discrimination and retaliation.”128 Similarly,
Neumann allegedly smoked marijuana around a pregnant WeWork
employee, who was demoted after both her pregnancies. 129 It took
years for Kalanick and Neumann’s alleged discriminatory
behaviors to catch the public’s eye.130 Top management, whether
male or female, should be held accountable by their board of
directors. They should not exist in responsibility-free vacuums.
Instead, the business community should ensure that both male and
female founders are held to the same standards.
Conclusion
We rely on outside directors to play an important monitoring
role in corporate law.131 Yet their presence on the board is not a
discrimination).
124. Amanda Hess, The Wing Is a Woman’s Utopia, Unless You Work There, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/magazine/thewing.html [perma.cc/MU8Z-NV5T] (“Members and their guests could be casually
racist.”).
125. Frida Garza, With Its Founder Gone, Can Man Repeller Ever Be Relevant
Again?, THE GUARDIAN (June 13, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/
lifeandstyle/2020/jun/13/man-repeller-leandra-medine-cohen-fashion-relevance
[perma.cc/HPL6-CRJM] (“[Founder Leandra Medine Cohen] was responding to
claims that the fashion blog . . . had failed its former staffers of color.”).
126. Robertson, supra note 123.
127. See Chernikoff, supra note 123 (“[E]gregious stories of [their]
misbehavior . . . were so slow to come out in the press, and far more incriminating.”).
128. Randall Stross, Why Companies Like Uber Get Away with Bad Behavior, N.Y.
TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/traviskalanick-uber-bad-behavior.html [perma.cc/CH68-TJQH]; see also Chernikoff, supra
note 121.
129. Chernikoff, supra note 123; Taylor Telford, WeWork and Ex-CEO Neumann
Accused of Pregnancy Discrimination by Former Employee, WASH. POST (Nov. 1,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/11/01/wework-ex-ceoneumann-accused-pregnancy-discrimination-by-former-employee/
[perma.cc/
9PNH-FPCH].
130. Chernikoff, supra note 123.
131. Prentice & Spence, supra note 26, at 1864 (noting the board’s role in
monitoring management and that director independence is a best practice for
corporate governance); see Avci et al., Independent Directors, supra note 1 (noting
that “[b]oards of directors have always been a traditional element of American
corporate governance”).
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panacea.132 Due to their status as outsiders, independent board
members lack the information necessary to fully understand the
company’s operations.133 Furthermore, outside directors often are
not completely independent from management: they move in
similar social and professional networks, sometimes developing
personal friendships.134 Without complete information and full
independence, it is not surprising that the monitoring function of
the board sometimes fails.135 Kamalnath proposes two solutions to
this dilemma. First, she suggests that increasing the diversity of
board members will help improve the board’s monitoring of
management.136 Second, she recommends both companies and
potential board candidates interact with third party intermediaries
to help reduce information gaps between these two sides of the labor
market.137
Kamalnath’s proposals are insightful and important steps in
the right direction. In addition, to maximize the benefits of board
diversity, corporations must ensure diverse voices are heard and
valued. Corporations can do this through investing in mentorship
and sponsorship programs that promote diversity, as well as
increasing networking opportunities.138 Finally, the board should
appoint members of high integrity and hold all executives to the
same standards of behavior. With these changes, future boards may
be better able to prevent—or at least better positioned to take
corrective action against—another major corporate scandal.

132. See Cox, supra note 25, at 1082–83 (arguing that because of their lack of
involvement in the company’s regular activities, independent directors often rely on
management for information); see also Khanna et al., supra note 34, at 1242 (noting
that directors may run in the same social circles as the CEO and thus not be fully
independent).
133. See Cox, supra note 25, at 1082–83.
134. See Khanna et al., supra note 34, at 1242–43 (explaining that board members
can be connected to CEOs through “common network ties”).
135. Annett, supra note 36 (recalling the board approval of stock options granted
to fictitious employees at Comverse Technology); see Avci et al., Elusive Monitoring
Function, supra note 15, at 285 (“[N]ot only may independent directors be illequipped to engage in serious oversight of the activities of management, they may
also be easily co-opted when they have the opportunity to personally participate in
self-interested transactions to the detriment of shareholders.”).
136. Kamalnath, supra note 51 (manuscript at 1).
137. Id. (manuscript at 15).
138. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1287
(“One tool that is crucial for women in dealing with the issues of voice and climbing
the corporate ladder is access to networks and mentors.”); see also Frank Dobbin &
Alexandra Kalev, Why Diversity Programs Fail, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2016, at
52 (observing that mentoring programs increase the diversity of a company’s
management).

